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1. The direct industry efficiency loss caused by a change in a single
distortion
1.1 The definite integral; definition and elementary properties
• i\
Construct the graph of the integrand y = f(x) in Figure 1.' Assume that f(x)
^ 0 for X & 0
Figure 1
Define the definite integral M(a, b) = J f(x) dx to equal the .shaded
a
curvilinear trapezoid bounded by y = fCx); the straight lines x = a, x=b and
the horizontal axis. The definite integral M(a, b) depends, (1) on the form
of the function f(x), (2) the lower limit of integration a, (3) the upper
limit of integration b. The definite integral MCa^i b) does not depend on
the variable of integration. The latter can be denoted by any letter; i.e.
we can replace x by any other letter without affecting the value MCa, b).
b -a
J fCx) dx + J f(x) dx = 0
therefore
b a
/ f(x) dx = -J f(x) dx, where a < b
a b
A constant factor may be taken outside the sign of the definite integral,
b b
J A • f(x) dx = A • J f(x) dx ; A a constant
a a
The definite integral of an algebraic sum of several functions is equal to
the algebraic sum of the integrals of the summands
b b b
J [fj^Cx) + f^Cx)] dx = J fj^(x) dx + J £2^^^
a a a
This sum of integrals in more compact notation can be written as
^2 2 ^
J S f^Cx) dx = 2 J f^Cx) dx ,
i=l i=l
1,2 The efficiency loss as the difference between an area under the
demand curve and supply curve
D S
Consider Figure 2 below. P (x) is the inverse demand curve of x. P (x) is
the inverse supply curve of x.
Figure 2
. P^x)
' ^ P^(x)
The integral M(a, b) represents the shaded triangle. It can'be"
measured as the difference between the areas under the inverse demand curve
D S
P (x) and P (x) for common limits x = a and x = b,
b b b
M(a, b) = J [P^Cx) - P^Cx)] dx = J P^(x) dx - / P^(x) dx
a a ' a
Consider the integral M(a, x) . - ' ^ •
X
M(a, x) = J f(x) dx
a
with the lower limit a constant the integral M(a, x) will.be a- function of"
the upper limit x. If f(x) is a-continuous function'then - ' -
d M(a, x)/dx = f Cx)
The derivative of the definite integral M(a, x) with-respect to the upper '
limit X equals the integrand. Consider the following-integral-
X XX
M(a, X) = ;[P°(x) - P®(x)] dx =J P°(x) dx - J P®(x) dx
a ^ - - a ' a ' -
Take the derivative with respect to the upper limit x
dM(a, x)/dx =P°(x) - P®(x) =D(x) ^0
where D(x) is the distortion determined as a function of market clearing
output X as in Figure 3 below.
Figure- 3
P
observe that the integral M(a, x) can now be written in terms of the
integrand D(x) as
X
M(a, x) = -J DCx) dx i 0
a
where M(a, x) measures the negative deadweight loss or efficiency loss as
represented by the shaded triangle. D(x) represents the difference between
D Sthe equilibrium price P (x) paid by consiiraers and equilibrium price P (x)
received by producers. The cause of the distortion D(x) is the use of a
distortion causing policy instrument T such as taxes or subsidies^ which
affect equilibrium output x®^, and therefore D, i.e. D[x®^CT)3. Typically,
0Q ^
D[x ^(T)[ ^ T, i.e. the line segment Ddoes not measure the policy
instrument T itself. However with a constant or specific tax per unit of
output Xwe have the special case that D[x®^CT)] = T = P^(x) - P^Cx).
1.3 Substitution of the variable in the integrand
Consider the integral M(a, b)
b
M(a, b) = J fCx) dx
a
Introduce a new variable z, where x is a function h of z, such that x = h(z)
is continuous and differentiable and
1) if z = c then h(c) = a
2) if z = d then hCd) = b
then
b d
M(a, b) = J fCx) dx = J f[hCz)] • 9hCz)/az • dz = MCc, d)
b b - -
f » » '
Proof; M(a, b) = J fCx) dx = FCx)| = F(b) - FCa)
a a
d b
MCc, d) « J f[hCz)] ah(z)/a2 dz = F[hCz)] I
c a
= FCb) - FCa) by 1, 2 above
1.4 Harberger's direct efficiency loss integral
^Consider the integral which measures the deadweight loss' triangle in Figure
4. •' ^ •
X
M(a, x) = J p(x) dx s. 0.
a
where D(x) = P^(x) - P^Cx) and Xis market clearing such that x^ '=, x^. The
market clearing quantities and prices are functions of distortion causing
policy instruments z. in. output-and input markets Cj = l,...,ra). The
%J
distortion in market i is a function of
(1) policy instrument(s) directly distorting market i.
(2) policy instruments z.- applied in related commodity and input
markets. A change in z. may have two "effects:
2.1 it may change the market clearing level, of output x^ in
market i
• ' n s2.2 it may change the distortion D. = (P. - P.) through unequal
V D ^ 'changes in market clearing prices and P? in market i.
Consider a system of interrelated markets. Assume a single market
intervention z applied in market x. By assumption all remaining markets
maintain undistorted competitive equilibrium. We want to write the
efficiency loss oc9urring in market x not as a function of x as in M(a, x).
but directly as a function of the distortion causing policy'instrument z.
Let the market clearing quantity x be a continuous differentiable function
of the distortion causing policy instrument z, i.e. x = hCz).
Furthermore if
1) if z = Zq then hCz^) = a
2) if z = then hCz^) =b
where Zq and are respectively the lower and upper limits of the
efficiency loss integral M(z^, z^). This integral is derived from M(a, b)
taken into account the following changes
bM(a.b) =f DCx) dx =J D[h(z)] • ah(z)/3z • dz =M(Zq, z^)
a Zq
Recalling that x =h(z) we obtain the Harberger efficiency loss integral
^1
MCZq, z^) = f D(z) dx/az • dz ^ 0
^0
If 2q 0 then hCz^) - a - 0 and MCO, z^) measures the shaded deadweight
loss triangle in the previous diagram. If Zq >0then M(Zq. z^) measures
the efficiency loss as a trapezoid. If z^ <0 then MCz^, z^) represents the
sum of the "subsidy" deadweight triangle MCzq, 0) and "tax" deadweight
triangle M(0^ z^), i.e. as M(Zq, z^).
Let z represent a fixed (uniform) tax T per unit of output x. We want
to evaluate the efficiency loss integral
^1
MCTq, T^) = f D(T) • ax®^/3T • dT ^ 0
With no tax Tq =0. Also D(T), =P^CT^^) -r P^(Tj^) = i.e^ the specific
tax currently levied in market x.
Using the previous procedure we can rewrite above expression as
•T,
MCO^ T^) = • J 3x VaT • dT ^ 0
0
With a Computible Genera! Equilibrium model it is possible to obtain an
exact numerical presentation of x®^ = liCT). It follows that MCO. T.) can
• I ' Li.
also be calculated exactly even though no explicit analjrtical representation
of x®^ = h(T) is available.
1.5 An example
Consider the following system of linear demand and supply curves and a
specific tax T^. ' ' '
1) P° ^ V D= a + b X
2) pS
g
= a + z X
3) P° - P® =
4)
D
X
S
= X
This system of linear equations can be rewritten in matrix form
P° pS X a a ^1
1 0 -b 1 0 0
0 1 -c 0 1 0
1 -1 0 0 0 1
Using Cramer's determinantal equations we obtain the following solution
eq
X ^ a a ^1
1 0 0
-c
b-C
b
b-C
b
b-C
0 1 0
-c
b-C
b
b-C
C
b-C
0 0 1
-1
b-C
1
b-C
1
b-C
It follows that = hCT) can be written as a linear function of the slope
parameters a, C and the tax T^. Consequently
3x®^/0Tj^ = =a constant <0
Integration yields
M(0^ T^) = • J dT = • 1 Jl ^ T? ^ 0
b-C n
0
The efficiency loss MCO^ increases proportionately to the square o_f the
fixed tax T and inversely proportional to (b-C), i.e. the sum of the
absolute values of the slopes.
D'In figure 5 below the initial inverse demand curve P (x) is rather
• • Sprice elastic. Given the inverse supply function P (x) and the fixed tax T
1 •
L
Figure 5
P +T
the efficiency loss equals the sum of the trapezoid 1 and the triangle 2.
If P^Cx) becomes more price inelastic the sum of the absolute values of the
S Dslopes of P (x) and P (x) increase. Holding T constant, the efficiency loss
decreases, because the sura of the triangles 2 + 3 is less than the sum of
the trapezoid 1 and the triangle 2.
It is also easy to show the equality of the following efficiency loss
integrals
M[a(t=0), b(T=T^)] =M(0^
For T = 0 we have from the matrix solution
x®^CT = 0) = -
b-C
• a +.
b-C
a
10
For T = we obtain
^ ^ (T =Ti) = - ^ . a • ct + • T
Also by definition
b b b
M[a, b] = J D(x) dx = J [P^Cx) - (x) ] dx = J • dx
Integration of the last term yields
Cb(T=T^)
M(a, b) = T. • x| = - T? =MCO. T.) £ 0
^ a(T=0) ^ ^ ^
2. Harberger's policy evaluation rule; the sum of direct and indirect
efficiency losses associated with a single distortion
Consider now a system of two interrelated commodity markets A and B,
with initial specific tax distortions and T^. Assuming linear inverse
demand and supply curves and equilibrium in both markets we have
P^a.bX^cX°
P° = d + e X° + f X°
A A A
a. cxl^r 4
p| =6+e xf +0x|
-1-4
4 =4
11
Figure 6
f +'T [T
'ft G '
12
In figure 6 the two horizontally striped triangles measure the respective
initial efficiency losses in markets A and B. Assume now that the specific
tax increases from to T^. We represent the increase in the efficiency
loss in market A caused by the increase in T. by the integral M. „ . As
A A* ^ 1
A
shown before this efficiency loss is measured by either of the following
integrals
^A
«A.T, ^^°A' ^A •
^A
The increase in T. causes an additional efficiency loss „ in the relatedA B-T^
distorted commodity market B
Xb(t1) X^(T^) •
"b-t. Kb "a' • ^ - ^b' • ^A = ^ Tg <1 ^ 0
The specific tax Tg by assumption is independent of changes in T^.
Integration of the last term above therefore yields
"b-T, =^B Kb'^ I' - Xb"^ =^B ^C
The efficiency loss in market B caused by an increase in the distortion in
market A is measured by the diagonally striped rectangle in market B in
figure 6.
13
The efficiency loss can also be written as
A
«B.T, T^] - J Tg . aXg/3T^ . d S0
The sum of the efficiency losses caused by an increase in the specific tax
T^ is the sura of the two integrals
«A.T, ^"b.T, =J" • ^Xb^^^A • <1 Ta i 0
^A
If Market B is not tax distorted then by definition T,, = 0 and the
D
second integral vanishes. If markets suffer substantial degrees of inter
vention e. g. with ad-valorera tax rates exceeding 100 percent, then the
indirect efficiency effects represented by the second integral will be very
large, and in^ortant for the purposes of project evaluation.
If the number of interrelated markets equals n and if we want to
ascertain the total efficiency loss caused by an increase in the specific
tax Tj then we need to calculate the sum of the following integrals
J
n n
ifi" ij = ^
T?
J
This sum of integrals is not a line (or path) integral because only T.
changes, all other distortion causing taxes (or policy instruments) are held
constant.
In our example we designated Tj^ and T^ to be specific taxes. They are
therefore independent of each other. However, with ad-valorera taxes the
price distortion in raarket i will depend on the ad-valorera tax t. in
14
market j, Taking this into account we obtain the policy evaluation rule
proposed by Harberger (2)
"ij = ^
mO
T.
J
3. Efficiency benefits of policy reform as a sum of Harberger integrals
3.1 Is the line integral path dependent?
Policy reform tjTpically proposes simultaneous changes in more than one
distortion causing policy instrument. The efficiency loss (gain) of policy
reform is a line integral
M
m n
n
t^
J
= I 2 M.. = S { X f D.(t.) ax./3t. • dt.)
j=l i=l j=l i=l 1 J 1 J J
t? -
J
where j = l...m refers to the mdistortions t^'to be changed simultaneously
and i = l...n refers to a system interrelated competitive markets within
which the m dis ortions initially exist.
The line integral is path independent. In the contrary case no
unique efficiency loss (or gain) could be assigned to simultaneous policy
reform. If were path dependent a cycle of reform and counter reform
would lead to either a steadily increasing overall efficiency loss or gain
(5, p. 367). Cyclical policy instability would be the key to increasing
economic welfare. With path dependence one might posit that the value of
reform would depend on its chronological sequence or path according to which
•15
Figure 7: Policy Reform and Path Dependence
(T^ T^)^ A' B''
"a-t^/tO
« (t|; t^)
' "a.Ta/t1
(tP
^ A' B''
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the policy instruments are changed. One presumably could choose the optimal
chronological sequence of policy reform. However within the comparative
statics framework used here chronological time and "paths" are incompatible
concepts i.e. the analysis prespecifies the time span within which all
reforms take place, there are no economically meaningful sub-intervals
within the time span that measures market equilibrium with and without
policy reform.
Figure 7 suggests two alternative policy reform sequences,
(1) (T°. T°) (T^, T°) (T^. tJ)
(2) (T°. T°) ^ (T°, tJ) - (T^. tJ)
The first sequence starts policy reform in the A market, followed by reform
in the B market. The second sequence reverses that order. Figure 7 shows
the direct and indirect efficiency losses which need to be calculated for
each of the four line segments involved,
«A.T, = ^ • -l^A
In general the market clearing will be a function of both distortion
and T„, The efficiency loss M. „ will therefore depend on the value
13 A* 1,
A
chosen for T„ (i.e. T^ or T^) when integrating above expression. Only in
C CD
the unlikely case that X. does not depend on T„, or when changes in T^ do
As o
not significantly affect X^, will have a unique value along
A
alternative path segments. Similar comments hold be extension for the
following integrals
«B.T, - ^ ^B^/^^A • ^^A
A
^B
•17
"B-Tg = ^ • ®^b"a' ^b'/®Tb • ^^B
^B
i3 ">
^b
Because of this we expect the following inequality to prevail
Path I; M +M +M +M .
A-T^lTg B-T^IT^ A.TglT^ B-T^:!!^
Path 2; M +M - l"*""
A.TglT^ B.TglT^ B-T^ItJ A-T^IT^
Difference: positive or negative
Alternative paths are expected to yield possibly substantially different
values for the overall efficiency loss (or gain). Should this be so, then
project or policy evaluation would attempt to measure the inmeasurable,—
j
3.2 The dual industry efficiency loss function
Consider a one output-two factor model of the competitive industry with
Specific tax distortions in all three markets as in figure 8.
P+T(X) represents the demand curve for X. The tilde indicates that
consumers pay the price received by producers P plus the specific tax T.
The price received by producers reflects along the derived supply curve S
Note that even if is a uniquely valued money measure, it's
interpretation as a money measure of welfare needs further discussion.
18
Figure 8
P+T(X)
P,(X,)
P2(X2)
19
the specific taxes and levied on and X2. Similarly the derived
demand curve for factor reflects the tax T on X and and the tax
X^. Assume a linear homogeneous production function X(X^ ^2^* choice
of and X2 determines X and equilibrium prices.
Sarauelson (5, p. 91) showed that for a competitive industry X^ and X2
will be chosen so as to maximize the following e3q)ression
X ' ^2
MaXjj ^X ' -f" dx - TX - ; P(Xj^) dx^ - - J P(X2)dX2 - T2X2}
0 0 0
The first integral measures the area under the demand curve P+T(X). The
second and third integrals measure the areas under'the factor--supply curves
Pj^CX^) and respectively. Disregarding tax revenues T*X, T2*X2
momentarily it will be seen that above expression maximizes the sum'of
consumers* surplus and factor rents. . This objective is modified by the
introduction of taxes only to the extent that we now maximize the sum of
consumers' surplus and producers' surplus after taxes. First order
optimality- conditions are the familiar resource allocation conditions
(P^+T^) = (P-T) aX/8X^
CP2+T2) = (P-T) aX/3X2
where P^^, P2 P and Xare functions of X^ and X2. The. two extremal"
conditions can be solved for optimal factor use X^ and X2. Optimal factor
•k *use X^ (T, Tj^, T2) and X2 (T, T^) can be shown to be functions of taxes
T, T^ and T2. For convenience introduce the following functional notation
20
X
f pTt(X) • dx =gcx^ X2)
0
X,
f PCX^) dx^ = hCX^)
0
^2
J PCX^) dx^ = i(X2)
0
^ A
Rewriting the maximand and substituting for optimal factor use X^^ and X^ we
have
M* = Max {gCX*. X*) -T-X( *X*) - hCX*) - T^-X* - iCX*) - T2"X23
Xi, X2
which can be written in compact form as
M* =M*CT. T^. T2)
3.3 Duality properties of competitive industry equilibrium adjustments
and the path independence of policy reform
Hotelling's Lemma (1, Appendix 1; 3, p. 594) yields the following optimal
adjustments in market clearing X, X^^ and X^as functions of the specific
taxes T, and T^.
3M*/3T =X*CT. T^)
aM /3T^ = X^ CT, T^)
aM*/aT^ =X*CT, T^)
21
.Given a competitive industry equilibrium the optimal adjustment functions
have the following duality property
ax^/sT^ =8V/st^8T2 =aV/ai^ST^ =ax^/ax^
r
ax^/aT =aV/aT^aT =aV/aT =ax*/aT2
"k
Consider now the total differential .dM
dM* =aM*/3T • dT +aM*/aT^ • dT^ +aM*/aT2 • dT2
This upon substitution can be written as
dM* =X*CT, T^, T2) dX +X*CT, T^, X2) dT +X^CX. X^, T2) dT2
•k
Taking the integral of dM we obtain the overall efficiency loss M^^
T^ X^ T^
M.. =; dM* =XX*CX. T^, X2)dX +/'X^CX. T^. T2)dX^.+ J' X^CX, T^, T2) dX2
X^ ' ' X^
Xhe duality property of the optimal adjustment functions is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the path independence of the line integral M^^
(3, p. 594). The one output-two factor model discussed here requires
knowledge about five parameters, a factor cost share, the elasticity of
factor substitution, the two factor supply price elasticities, the output
. I -i
demand price elasticity (7). For multi-commodity and multi-factor models
the number of required parameters grows exponentially. This however is a
separate issue from path independence of Therefore a unique value of
M^^ should exist for even large scale models if the optimal adjustment
functions reflect the required duality property. This property is typically
imposed when estimating the X*(X, X^, T2). Often the duality property when
tested is not statistically significant. It may indicate that the industry
22
is not competitive. Unrestricted parameter estimates for the X.(T, T., T^)
X X ^
tj^ically will not exhibit the required duality property for path
independence. Policy reform then will not have a unique overall efficiency
loss or gain.
3,4 Finding the integrating factors for the line integral
When XCXj^ X^) is linearly homogeneous then the maximum M(T, T2)
will be a homothetic function in the specific taxes T, and (3, p. 99).
Such functions have the property that = J dM is path independent. The
required integrating factors are usually not easily found if one wants to
exhibit the integration process in analytical detail. Homothetic functions
are not necessarily homogeneous (6, p. 89). If however M(T, T^, T2) is
homogeneous of degree r in specific taxes then we have by definition
M*(XT XT^ \T^) = M*
Euler's theorem then states that
aM*/3T • T+aM*/aT^ • +9M*/aT2 • T2 =rM*
Using the results from Hotelling's Lennna
* * * *
Xj^ • T + X^ • + X^ ' T2 = rM
it
Furthermore the first partials of M , i.e. the optimal adjustment functions
* jV *
X , X^ are homogeneous of degree (r-1) (6, p. 88). Therefore
ax'^ /aT -T +ax*/aT^ • +ax*/aT2 • T2 =Cr-i) x*ct t^ T2)
ax*/aT • T+ax*/aT^ • t^ +9X*/aT2 • T2 =(r-i) x* (x t^ T2)
ax^/aT • T+ax^/ST^ • t^ +3X2/0X2 • T2 =Cr-i) x* (t t^ T2)
23
Observe from page 15 that the Harberger integral for tax T is written as
ijil
3 •
I = J T • 8X/aT dT +. J aX^/3T dT + J, dT
i=l
T° T° T°'
The partial derivatives -in this e3q>ressidn are fdund in the 'first column of
the above Jacobian matrix. We know that these partial derivatives are dual
to the partial derivatives appearing- in the first row o"f the Jacobian. We
therefore may rewrite ' '
^1 • ^1' - • '
3 • ^ .
I ^ ^ dX + J aX/ST^ dT +"J T^ 8X/aT2 dT
T° i .1 T°
Taking the sum of the integrands and -substituting the righthand side of the
first row of, the Jacobian we have , .r . ,
3 ^
I Mix =Cr-D -X* (T T^ T^) dT
tO
It follows that the Harberger line integral or overall efficiency loss
or gain can be written as
ijil ml
1 2
3' 3 •
XXMij =Cr-1) {J X* dT +; X* dTj^ +J X* dT^}
- ' V T° - X? _ - •
Recalling page 14 we find that
3 3 ^
M,, = Z 2 M = Cr-1) J dM
j i. -J -
2A
Except for the integrating factor (r~l) the dual efficiency loss function
! dM is identical to the Harberger line integral
Hotelling (3, p. 606) showed that with initially undistorted
competitive industry equilibrium and a second order linear approximation of
•k
the partials in the Jacobian the dual industry efficiency loss function M (T
T2) is homogeneous of degree two in taxes T, and T^, i.e. r = 2,
first partial derivatives of M , i.e. the optimal adjustment functions X (T
* -k
T2), (T T2), X2 (T T^) are then linearly homogeneous in T, T^,
and T2. With the integrating factor equal to one we immediately establish
the equality of results between the Harberger line integral and the dual
r *efficiency loss function J dM .
The principal result established in the foregoing paragraphs is that
•k
the dual money measure of welfare M(T T^ T2) is homothetic in T T2. It
r *follows that the dual efficiency loss function J dM is path independent.
The Harberger line integral will always equal the value of J dM , but
i!
the required integrating factors are difficult to find, unless M(T T^^ T2)
is linear homogeneous of degree r. With no initial distortions r=2. The
c *integrating factor then equals unity, effortlessly yielding M^^ = J dM .
Diewert's bi-quadratic flexible functional form (1, p. 89) is a natural
•k
candidate for the simultaneous statistical estimation of M and its first
k -k k
partials X , X^^ and X2 as functions of specific distortions T, T^^ and T2.
The
3.5 An alternative method of establishing the path independence of
policy reform
Consider a model with three distorted markets as in Figure 9. Subtract
from the area under the demand curve D„ the sum of the areas under the two
X
25
0 „0factor supply curves and for the competitive equilibrium (X^^,
1 2 '
X^). The difference equals the sum of producers' and consumers' surplus
plus the sum of tax revenues.
M° = J P(X) dx - J. P(X^) dx^ - J P(X2) dXj
M° =CSCX°, X°, X°) +PS(X°, X°, X°) +T'X° ;+ Tj^X° +T^x"
X ' X° X^^0 ^1 ^2
Consider an increase AT in the output tax. The corresponding industry
competitive equilibrium in Figure 9 is characterized by market clearing
quantities (X^; xj; X^).
The money measure of welfare M now equals
xi xj - xi
= ; PCX) dX - ; PCX^) - S PCX^) dX2
0 0 0
The change in the money measure of welfare equals
xi "• xj x^
e *
AM = - M° =;, PCX) dX - ; P{X^) dX^ - J P(X2) dX2
, . X° X° X°
The three integrals,are represented as the horizontally striped trapezoids
in Figure, 9. The efficiency loss AM caused by AT equals the heavily lined
trapezoid at the outer edge of the efficiency loss triangle. Observe that
this efficiency loss includes the induced tax revenues losses in the two
distorted input markets. The tax revenue losses in these markets are
indicated by the heavily lined parallelograms. We conclude that AM
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Figure 9
S (T+AT; Tj; T^)
S (T; T^; T^)
S (Tj: T2)
S.. +T
•Dx^(T. ip
D^^(T+iT; T^) Djj (T+AT; Tj)
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represents the Harberger efficiency loss integral
T+AT
AM = Z r .T. 9X./8T dT
. 11
1
T
Table 1 presents the integrals and their signs that measure the efficiency
benefits resulting from the proposed tax increases AT; AT^^; AT2'-
Summing these integrals by rows we obtain
Xq+axcat)+ax(at^)+Axcat2)
A area under the = J • PCX) dX < 0
[
X« - --
demand curve
X°+iX^(AT)+AX^(AT^)+AX2(AT2)
A area under the • •
factor supply = J P(XJ dX^i . 0
curve S„
^ x° •^1
X2+AX2(AT)+AX2(ATj)+A2CAT2)
A area under the
factor supply = ' f ' • P(XJ dX , 0 .
curve S„
2 X°
^2
The difference between the change in area under the D.^ demand curve and the
sum of the changes under the S„ and factor supply measures the overall
^1 ^2
industry efficiency loss associated with the proposed increase in
taxation levels. Previously (page 15).'we showed that is a sum of
Harberger integrals - - '
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m n m
M.. = 2 1 M.. = X ( / D. (t.) ax,/3t. • dt.)
j=l i=l j=i ^ ^ J J
J
The numerical values of the_upper limits of the integrals used in
calculating the changes in area under the demand curve and under the factor
supply curves are path independent. therefore has a unique value. The
approach embodied in Table 1 provides us with an alternative proof that the
sum of Harberger integrals is path independent.
* jt
Measuring the efficiency effects of general policy reform in a single
market
Consider a one 'OUtput-two factor model of the competitive industry,-'
Assume specific tax distortions in all-three-markets. The integrals on the
diagonal in Table 2 measure-the three direct efficiency losses, whereas the
six off-diagonal integrals measure indirect efficiency losses. The
Harberger efficiency loss integral for specific tax is the sum of the
integrals listed in the first column. Similar Harberger integrals can be
constructed by summing the integrals in columns two and three for specific
taxes T^ and respectively. Alternatively one may sum the integrals by
rows. Such a sum shows that the combined" efficiency-loss in a^-given market
X, or caused by the combined effects of the distortionsroperating in
all related markets. Summing the three column or three row totals yields
the path independent line integral M,. previously discussed. Path
independence existed because of the duality conditions
30
8X^/8T^ = aX/3T^
ax^/BT^ = ax/ST^
ax^/ai^ = ax^/aT2
Given this it follows that the efficiency loss matrix in Table 2 is not
symmetric.
^2-Tx ^
^2*^1 *
If X2 is an undistorted factor market then = 0. The integrals in the
third row and third column all vanish.
If the distortion T2 is "small" then Al^ will tend to be small.
Furthermore if ax/aT2 and ax^/aT2 tend to be small then the remaining
integrals in the third row and third column will tend to be "small". In
conducting a project evaluation one may therefore want to exclude the
efficiency loss effects caused by T2. The problem with the procedure is
that in general equilibrium there will be many factor markets with small
distortions. The cumulative effect of many small distortions is not
negligible.
If both and T2 equal zero then in Table 2 all integrals except
vanish. The evaluation of the Harberger Integral then coincides
X
with the evaluation of the direct efficiency loss caused by T^ in
X
market X, Traditionally project evaluation restricted itself to calculating
direct efficiency losses only, ignoring the possible off-diagonal indirect
efficiency losses listed in Table 2.
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All of the integrals listed in Table 2 can be given a geometric
interpretation. In Figure 10 we assume an initial equilibrium price Pq and
Xq. This pair of observations may be thought to lie on demand curve D as
well as on the derived supply curve S and the ordinary supply curve S.
Note that the ordinary supply curve S at (PqJ Xq) is more price elastic than
the derived supply curve S . This is because the latter assumes that as
output X increases, factor prices and will also increase. The
•k
marginal cost of additional output along S is therefore larger than for
additional output along S.
Assume that we impose a specific tax T. Considering the ordinary
supply curve industry output would equal X^. However, the decrease in
output also lowers factor prices P^^ and The relevant after tax
equilibrium output is. therefore X^. The relevant efficiency loss is
measured by the sum of triangles (3+A), and not (1+2+3). The loss integrals
in Table 2 list the appropriate behavioral relationships to be used for the
geometric interpretation of direct and indirect efficiency losses.
With the output tax T in place assume the imposition of an input tax
T^. In figure 11 the direct efficiency loss „ is measured by triangle
1
A in factor market Note that the appropriate behavioral boundaries are
"k
the factor supply curve and the derived demand curve (T^^ T2). The
latter takes into account existing distortions in all related markets. By
assumption T > 0 and T =0, The imposition of T, causes the derived
1 2 ^
A
supply curve S (T) to shift upwards. Equilibrium output will now equal
A *
X (T; Tj^) which is less than the previous output X (T). Because T is a
specific tax the distortion as measured by the difference in the price paid
33
Figure 10
S +T
. S+T
Xi Xq
. 34
by users (P+T) and the price received by producers P will remain constant.
It follows that the indirect efficiency loss AMy „ equals the loss in tax
revenue in market X, i.e. the rectangle (7+8+13), Because T2 = 0 the
indirect efficiency loss in the second input market equals zero.
2 1
For the same reason the remaining entries in the third row and third column
of Table 2 will also equal zero.
The question arises as to whether the Harberger line integral can
be measured in a single market. We can confirm this possibility by
observing the following correspondences:
= (10+15+16) = (8+9+14) = 0
X 1 2
^2-Tx ° ° ° ° ° °
By definition = Z X AM.. ; the sum of the matrix elements equals the
i j
deadweight loss triangle (4+8+9+14+19+10+15++16) in figure 10. Observe
that, as expected, a single row sum or column sum in Table 1 cannot capture
all of the efficiency losses. Note also that AMy „ = 0 because T«
initially equalled zero.
In figure 11 the money measure of welfare M given T and equals the
sum of consumers' surplus (1) and producers' surplus (20+21). The
imposition of T and T^ decrease Mby the tax revenue and efficiency losses
previously discussed. Subtracting the latter from the AM trapezoid we may
conclude that the rectangle (2+3+5+5+7+11+12+13+17+18) represents the sum of
the tax revenues resulting from the imposition of T and T^^. With both T and
in place, the revenue resulting from T equals the rectangle (2+3+5+5+7).
(T; T )
X.
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Figure 11
X*(T;Tp X*(T)
S (T; xp
S (T,)
(T)
X2
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The remaining rectangle (11+12+13+17+18) must represent the revenue
resulting from
This proposition can also be proven in an alternative way. With T in
place the imposition of will shift the derived supply curve S (T) to
is
S (T; Tj^) . The total welfare loss to consumers and producers caused by
measured in the output maket X equals the trapezoid (3+4+6+8+11), The sum
of the triangles (4+8) in X measure the efficiency loss, measured
equivalently as triangle 4 in the input market X^^. -The area of the
remaining parallelogram (11+6+3) in X equals the tax revenue rectangle (2+3)
in the X^ market. Note the area of the parallelogram (11+6+3) coincides
with the previously cited tax revenue from as rectangle (11+12+13+17+18)
in X.
With T in place the imposition of results in a tax loss equal to
rectangle (8+9+14) offset by a tax gain equal to rectangle (11+12+13+17+18).
It is possible therefore that the imposition of an additional tax, such as
Tj^, may decrease total tax revenue as well as increasing the overall
efficiency loss
5. Establishing directions for price and tax reform
5.1 Incremental changes in the sum of tax revenue effects and
efficiency losses in interrelated distorted markets
Table 3 illustrates a methodology for determining the direction of tax
or price reform. We consider single tax reforms, composite tax reform and
general tax reform. Project evaluation at efficiency prices is based on
equilibrium prices which would result with general tax reform. However if
37
general tax reform will not be forthcoming throughout the life of the
project then either composite tax reform, single tax reform or no reform at
all would form the appropriate basis for calculating the vector of
efficiency shadow prices to be used in project evaluation. Note that Table
2 has been inserted into Table 3. The bottom row represents a series of
Harberger efficiency loss integrals. With more than one tax being changed
such integrals are path independent line integrals.
With specific taxes we can also calculate the direct and indirect
revenue effects listed in Table A and inserted in Table 3 as the right hand
side column and the next''to bottom row. The diagonal of Table A lists the
direct revenue effects. In principle they are of indeterminate sign. If
the primary purpose of the increase in the tax is to raise revenue one would
want the direct revenue effects to be positive. However, increased tax
rates can also be used to induce users to voluntarily consume less than a
desirable maximum quantity, whereas subsidies can be used to insure the
consumption of minimum desirable levels. For many countries imported
consumption articles are demerit goods, whereas basic needs are merit goods.
The levels of distortion are often such that the span of the direct revenue
effects associated with increased tax rates are negative. The justification
for this, apart from the (de)merit objective pursued, is that alternative
policy mechanisms do not exist or would result being more costly to the
public sector.
The indirect tax affects T2 • AX2(AT^) and T^^ • AXj^CAT2) are of the
same sign, i.e. either both are positive or negative. A tax on input T^,
holding output price constant, will through substitution encourage increased
use of input Xg, But if the price of output is not constant the use of X2
in final equilibrium may actually decrease. If so both of above effects
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will be of negative sign. It follows that colunin totals and row totals are
of indeterminate sign.
The Jacobian of the dual efficiency loss function ^ is negative
definite. Also in figure 11 we showed that is negative and total tax
revenue positive. It follows that in Table 4 at least one of the column
totals and one of the row totals must be negative. If one increases all
three taxes simultaneously the overall efficiency loss as well as
overall tax revenue will increase. In Table 3 at least one of the marginal
tax revenue effects in the bottom row or right hand side column must be
positive. A similar comment holds for the Harberger efficiency effects.
Assume that T^ is increased by AT^ holding and constant at
positive levels of taxation. The direct efficiency loss increases with the
square of Direct tax revenue initially increases and then decreases
with the increase in T^. Indirect tax revenues will decrease. In figure 11
A
the sum of the three changes measures the change in welfare caused by the
changes in T^. Given distorted input markets there must be an initial
such that an increase in T^ has a positive net welfare effect. However,
with a continued increase in T^ the net welfare effect turns negative.
Figure 12 suggests that there exists a range of values for T^ such that
changes in T^ havp but small net welfare effects.
With tax reform, changes in more than one tax need to be contemplated.
For each tax one could construct the net welfare effect resulting from small
changes in the prevailing level of that tax. It will then be possible to
rank the net welfare effects from small changes in different taxes from
large positive to large negative. If no additional tax revenue needs to be
raised one should give first consideration to increasing those taxes with
large positive welfare effects and simultaneously reducing those taxes with
\AT.
•'41
Figure 12
X • ATjj + Tjj • AX(ATj^)
not welfare effect
AT,
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large negative net welfare effects. If, however, such taxes are used to
achieve minimum or maximum consumption levels of (de)merit goods and no less
costly alternatives exist to achieve these objectives, then the rule loses
much of its applicability. If additional tax revenue is to be raised,
having excluded changes in taxes with large negative or positive net welfare
effects, one must resort by default to changes in taxes with smaller net
welfare effects. From previous analysis we know that the net welfare effect
of a simultaneous increase in such taxes must be negative.
5.2 Incremental changes in weighted money measures of welfare
For purposes of project or policy evaluation tax revenue effects and
efficiency losses are often of secondary interest. Primary interest may
focus on other money measures of economic welfare such as changes in
consumers' surplus, producers' surplus and factor rents. Table 5 presents
the unweighted exact integral and first order general equilibrium effects of
single reforms of tax-subsidy distortions in a one output-two input model of
the competitive industry.
In Figure 13 we levy a specific tax T„ on X given previously levied
A
specific input taxes and T2. We then have the following correspondences
between the entries in Table 5 and the geometry of Figure 13
X
=J • 8X/3Tjj • dTjj s 1/2 • dX*CTj^)
^X
The efficiency loss caused by the output tax T^ is measured exactly by the
above integral and approximately by one half of the tax multiplied by the
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Figure 13
(13.a)
S (T, ^
^ S*(T
3/^ 4 X
X
\ (T.)
Dx (T; T^)
r ^2-
D" (T,)
D* (T; T^)
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change in market clearing output X . caused,-by levying T^. The exact
efficiency loss in Figure 13.a.equals the sum of triangle :(3-+5) which also
it
exactly equals one half of dX (T^) as demonstrated below by;enlarging
the area around the initial price-quantity equilibrium in the output
market.
Figure 14
46
K
Typically the demand curve and derived supply curve (T^^; T2) will be
non-linear. For large changes in a first order approximation'becomes
then increasingly inexact.
^1
ACS^.^ =J X• aP°/3T^ • dT SX* • dP°(Tjj).
X
^X
The change in consumers' surplus can be measured exactly by the
X
above integral or approximately by X• dP^(T^): i.e. by final equilibrium
A
output X multiplied by the increase in price paid by the consumer. In
figure 13,a rectangle (1+2) equals X• dP^(T^). The percentage error equals
[3/(1+2+3)] and increases with the square of T^, For proportionately large
changes in T^ the first order approximation becomes increasingly inexact.
Similar observations hold for the measurement of the change in producers'
surplus. '
The change in tax revenue is measured exactly by the sum of the
X
changes in consumers' and producers' surplus, i.e. by rectangles
[(1+2) + (3+A)] in Figure 13.a. It is measured also exactly by the
following expression
AE^. =X* . dT^ +Tj, . dX*
X
*
where is the initial tax level and X the after tax level of market
clearing output. In Figure 12 the initial level of T^ = 0, and therefore
dT^ = T^. Usually, however, we will want to consider a change in an already
A A
existing tax levy. In Figure 14 we increase T by AT. We observe
. A7
Figure 15
S [T + AT; Tj-; T^]
(T; Tj; T^)
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X* • dT^ = (1+2) + (13+14)
• dX* = - (6+7+11)
The omission of the revenue loss represented by the second term would
seriously overstate the gain in revenue from increasing beyond its
present level.
The change in factor surplus in the first input market AFS^ „ is
•^1 -^x
measured by the following expression
^X
=J" . dT . . dP^d^)
T°
X
S ' sIn above integral represents the market clearing price as a function
of Tj^. Recall that the first partials of the industry dual efficiency loss
function generate the market clearing levels of X, X^^ and X2 as functions of
g
the distortions T; and T2. Given that the factor supply curve is
a monotonic function of X^ the corresponding change in market clearing
S Sfactor price dP^(T^) can be calculated exactly. The expression X^^ • dPj^(T^)
is nevertheless a first order approximation. It corresponds to rectangle
(1+2) in figure 13.c.
The levy of output T^^ causes an indirect revenue loss in the first
input market
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The integral vill measure the indirect tax loss (gain) exactly even if the
demand and supply curves are non-linear and if taxes are not specific in
nature. Given either of these circumstances the right hand side term will
represent a first order approximation only.
For purposes of project evaluation one often assumes different relevant
social values of marginal income. Table 6 shows how income redistribution
judgments can be incorporated with the previous analysis in order to
identify desirable directions for tax and price reform. The entries in
Table 6 are all money measures of welfare, i.e. expressible in dollar
values. To the extent that they express relative social values it is
necessary to choose a numeraire income concept. The numeraire concept may
be chosen arbitrarily. In Table 6 our choice of numeraire is tax revenue.
More precisely the marginal social value of one additional dollar of tax
revenue is set equal to unity. One additional dollar of consumers' surplus
has a value in terms of the marginal tax revenue numeraire, etc. The
difficult part of project evaluation is to obtain validated values for the
X's in Table 6. There is no good reason to assume they all equal unity as
in traditional benefit-cost analysis. The net social benefit of a project
is very sensitive as to the choice of X's, reinforcing the need for
validation when including equity considerations in project evaluation.
In Table 6 the net social benefit of a single tax reform is the sum of
weighted efficiency, consumers' surplus, factor surpluses and tax revenue
effects. If the net social benefit is positive for a proposed increase in
the tax then such an increase should be adopted. If the net social benefit
is negative one should consider decreasing the level of that specific tax.
Taking tax revenue as a denominator it is possible to calculate the net
51
social benefit (positive or negative) per additional dollar of tax revenue.
With constant tax revenue one ought to increase taxes with large net social
benefits and decrease those with large negative social benefits. The
ranking and thrust of the recommended tax reform are very sensitive to the
choice of relative equity weights. All parties are affected by tax reform.
There is little chance as to concensus on equity weights. The specific
nature of enacted tax reform therefore will reflect the distribution of
political and executive power within a given country-and possibly external
fiscal policy constraints imposed upon the country.
6. Establishing directions for price and tax reform: a dual approach
6-1 The dual industry marginal social benefit function
We previously derived the industry dual efficiency loss.function
. . AM = M(T; T^; ,T2)
Applying Hotelling's Lemma the first partial derivatives generates the
optimal equilibrium level of output ,and inputs as a function of the
distortions
X* =X*CT; T^; T2)
X* =X*CT; -T^; T2)
X- =X*(T, T^; T^)
It follows that by using the demand curve for output D„ and the factor
supply curves and the -corresponding equilibrium price levels can
also be calculated. .All of these results are based on competitive profit
maximizing behavior fulfilling the usual first order conditions
52
CP-T). ax/ax^ = cp^ + T^)
(P-T) ax/ax^ = CP2 + T2) •
The implicit social welfare function used assigned equal relative weights
to all money measures of welfare. Consider now the explicit social welfare
function with different relative equity weights
P^^1 ^2
M(X, T; T^; T^) =XJ XCP) dP + J X(P^) dP^ + ^2 ^ ^^2
pO 0 0
^ ^1 ^2
+ 1[T»X + T^-X^+T2-X2]
taking tax revenue as numeraire. The upper and lower limits of the
integrals are the equilibrium prices as determined by initial and subsequent
levels of taxation. The- shadow price of a tax is the partial equilibrium of
M(X; T; T^^; T^) with respect to that tax. Using the Leibniz formula
in differentiating an integral whose integrand and limits depend on the
parameters T; and T2 we obtain successively the three shadow prices for
these taxes
aM/3T = x«x«ap/aT + A^*x^*ap^/aT +'x '^>X2*d?^/dT + x
+T»ax/aT +T^«ax^/aT +ax^/ax ^ o
aM/aT^ = X'X»ap/aT^ + x^»x^ ap^/aT^^ + X2*X2»9P2/aT^ + x^
+ T-ax/aT^+T^-ax^/aT^ + t^ ax^/aT^ • o
= X'X'ap/aT2 + x '^Xj^«ap^/3T2 + X2-X2-aP2/aT2 + X2
+ T*aX/aT2+T^ ^2 ^^2^ '^^ 2 < °
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All market clearing prices and quantities are kno^ functions of the
distortions T; T2. We therefore have a non-linear-system of three
equations in these three-distortions.- A distortion will be optimal if dts
shadow price ,equals zero. A tax' structure'is optimal if all relevant'shadow
prices simultaneously equal-zero. In principle'the above-three equations*
can be solyed simultaneously for the optimal tax levels T; 'T^^; T2.
A tax structure will rarely stay optimal because of frequent shifts in
behavioral relationships and intermittent-revisions'of- equity weights.- If
needed adjustments are postponed—''' the need for tax reform may .become
urgent. It is usually not evident the reform is advocated because of
validated changes in the "social welfare function or because of changes in
market conditions which reflect'themselves in shifts in demand and supply •
curves and thereby create a need for tax adjustments.
Assume that, the tax structure'-is optimal. "All shadow prices-of the
distortions equal zero. . It follows that the three previous equations can be
solved for the relative equity weights consistent with the proposition.
Examination of these weights is useful if only because of the-expectations
that they deviate very little from unity. ' ^
Assume now the advocacy of a new tax structure which can be taken as
optimal. Allowing for acciunulated exogenous shifts in demand and-supply
curves the equity weights consistent with the advocated tax_ structure can be
• 'I *
calculated. Comparison of the new weights with the old weights is
particularly useful. The first order redistributive consequences of tax
reform are typically large relative to the second order efficiency gains or
—^ continuous adjustments in specific taxes is administratively and
politically impossible. Optimal tax structures, if they exist, are
temporary phenomena.
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losses. The latter should not be used to obfuscate unvalidated changes in
equity weights. Consultancy reports prepared by international lending
agencies for the use of individual country governments would gain much in
transparency if the motivation for the advice given could be clearly imputed
to perceived changes in either the social welfare function or the
functioning of markets per se.
6*2 The social benefit of policy reform as the sum of two line
integrals
Rigorous consideration of the optimality of the tax structure typically
receives short shrift. Consider therefore an exogenously formulated tax
reform package AT; AT^; AT2. The previous three equations can be used to
evaluate the social benefits of the -proposed reform by calculating the
following integrals between the appropriately defined upper and lower
limits.
T®+AT T°+AT
AMj^.T " 9M/aT-dT = li J [X.X. aP /8T + T. aX./9T]dT) + AT'X I 0111 IL ' X
T° T°
tJ+at^ T°+AT^
am^ = J aM/aT -dT = i:c J [A.x.ap./8T. + T.ax./aTjdT.3+"AT -X, ^ 0
II 0 0 iiii iill 11<
Ti-
T°+AT2 T°+AT2
^ .X = J" aW/AT^-dT^ =E{ ; [X.X. aP./ST^ +T^3X^/3T2]dT2),+AT2*X2 ^0
' ' T°2 ^2
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The sum and component benefits," as expected, are unsigned. Note that a
similar expression was developed earlier In determining the change in social
benefit associated with a discrete change in a basic needs target (8).
It is a matter of practical interest to determine the sensitivity of
the social benefit measure,'- the optimal tax structure and socially optimal
tax'Structure-and socially optimal market equilibria to changes in relative
equity weights.' If such sensitivities-are minimal then traditional
benefit-cost analysis with its preference for equal relative weights for
different measures of welfare would be largely vindicated. For this purpose
the previous two stage optimization procedure is not convenient,—^ We now
want to determine the optimal resource allocation X2) simultaneously
with the optimal tax structure (T; T^; , Consider the following
unconstrained maximization problem
max iX[J P?T(X) dX - CP-T)«X] + - f PCX^) dX^]
X^; X^; T; T^; q ^
^2
"*• ^2 " ^ ^ 1*[T»X +T^-X^ +
0
Maximization of the expression within accolades requires that five first
order conditions are satisfied. The social benefit measure Mwill depend
parametrically on the relative equity weights
M = M(\;
Applying Hotelling's Lemma and taking first partials determines the money
— the first stage determined the nature of profit maximizing behavior,
given taxes. The second stage, starting with the optimal response functions
determined in the first stage, determines the optimal tax structure.
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measures of welfare as functions of theX equity weights. Therefore
aM/3X = CS = CS (X
aM/ax^ = Fs^ = FS^ (X x^ x^)
aM/ax^ = FS2 = FS^ cx x^ X2)
Study of these relationships shows how a j:hange in relative equity weight
will redistribute economic welfare in terms of the tax revenue numeraire
among classes of beneficiaries using optimally adjusted taxes for that •
purpose.
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